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Since the Supreme Court found that access to abortion is a
constitutional right in Roe v. Wade, the debate around abortion moved
to the streets, particularly around the actual facilities that offer
abortions.2 Some of those protests have been peaceful, others have
taken a tragic turn for the worst, resulting in injuries and death.3 In
response, courts imposed injunctions aimed at the most unruly
protestors and legislatures passed laws limiting the ability to protest
within a certain distance of an abortion clinic and its patients.4 In
1
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2009, the City of Chicago enacted an ordinance that created an eightfoot exclusion zone around the patient, when within fifty feet of an
entrance to a healthcare facility.5 And in February 2019, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the Chicago ordinance.6 The court found that the
ordinance was content neutral and narrowly tailored to achieve a
significant governmental interest, relying on a nineteen-year-old
Supreme Court precedent in Hill v. Colorado that upheld a nearly
identical regulation.7
While the Seventh Circuit quickly resolved the challenge in Price
v. City of Chicago, it spent the next twenty pages questioning today’s
validity of that precedent.8 As a result, while the ordinance is in effect
in Chicago, the Supreme Court is also reviewing the pending petition
for writ of certiorari.9 If the Court grants certiorari in this case, it could
be used as a vehicle to strike down the precedent upholding abortion
clinic bubble zone regulations. It could also be an opportunity for the
Court to provide some clarity on the intersection of the First
Amendment’s protections for free speech with the Fourteenth
Amendment's fundamental right to privacy, including the right to
access abortion.
The tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendments is
especially visible in the context of anti-abortion protests. In response
to this tension, courts imposed injunctions and legislatures passed laws
limiting speech outside of reproductive healthcare facilities. Those
injunctions and statutes have two common elements, referred to here
as buffer zone and bubble zone. Buffer zone refers to an exclusion area
within a certain number of feet of an entrance to an abortion clinic,
which prohibits anyone from standing within that exclusion zone.
Bubble zone refers to a floating exclusion zone around a patient
5

Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id.
7
Id. at 1119; 530 U.S. 703.
8
Id. at 1118-19.
9
SCOTUSBLOG, Price v. City of Chicago, Illinois,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/price-v-city-of-chicago-illinois/ (last
visited Dec. 6, 2019).
6
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entering or leaving the clinic, which prohibits others from approaching
within a certain radius of that patient, for the purpose of protesting
their choice.
While these laws are clearly aimed at suppressing anti-abortion
protests in public places, the Supreme Court has deemed buffer and
bubble zones to be content neutral.10 As content neutral regulations
they are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires that they be
narrowly tailored toward a significant state interest.11 If the Court
found these regulations to be content based, meaning that they regulate
the speech based on its content, then they would have to survive strict
scrutiny—a very high standard which requires that the laws be
narrowly tailored toward a compelling governmental interest.12
How did the Court then find that these laws, which are explicitly
aimed at suppressing anti-abortion speech in public places, are content
neutral? The Court did so by applying a content neutrality test that is
different from the traditional test which it has consistently applied in
other contexts.13 The Court’s desire to find bubble and buffer zones to
be content neutral caused it to depart from its traditional analysis, in
order to apply a lower constitutional scrutiny, thereby assuring that at
least some buffer and bubble zones survive the constitutional
challenge. But nearly twenty years after Hill, its rationale cannot
withstand the test of time. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, both
in the context of abortion and non-abortion speech, directly undercut
the very reasoning the Court used to deem bubble and buffer zones
content neutral.14
As the Seventh Circuit correctly pointed out in Price, the Court’s
ruling in Hill is flawed and cannot be reconciled today.15 However, it
remains binding precedent. This article will discuss why the Court’s
content based analysis in Hill is flawed and why the Court should
10

See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719; McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 497 (2014).
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 477.
12
Id. at 478.
13
See infra Part IV.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See Price, 915 F.3d at 1117.
11
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correct it. Part I of this article discusses the evolution of bubble and
buffer zones and its treatment by the Court. Part II discusses the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Price. Part III explores the tensions that
the Seventh Circuit noted between Hill and its subsequent First
Amendment jurisprudence. And Part IV explains why buffer and
bubble zone regulations are content based and thus should be subject
to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny, strict scrutiny. Part IV
also explains how the regulations can, with slight modifications,
survive strict scrutiny.
REVIEW OF SUPREME COURT BUBBLE AND BUFFER ZONE PRECEDENT
Madsen v. Women's Health Center
In 1993, a Florida state court entered a permanent injunction
against local abortion protestors.16 The injunction contained, amongst
other things, two specific prohibitions. First, the protestors could not
approach within thirty-six feet of a specific abortion clinic’s entrance
(the buffer zone).17 Second, the protestors were prohibited from
"physically approaching" patients of the clinic within 300 feet of that
clinic (the bubble zone).18 The injunction was challenged in the state
and federal courts. The state appellate court and the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the injunction.19 But the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down the injunction as an
improper regulation of the content of speech, in violation of the First
Amendment.20 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to

16

Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-60.
Id. at 760-61.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 761.
20
Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 712 (11th Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1994), and on reh'g en banc, 41
F.3d 1422 (11th Cir. 1994).
17
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the Eleventh Circuit and upheld in part and struck down in part the
injunction.21
In reviewing the constitutionality of the two provisions of the
injunction, the Court first had to decide what level of scrutiny applied
to the injunctions.22 Traditionally, laws limiting protected speech are
subject to the highest scrutiny—strict scrutiny.23 However, the Court
carved out an exception for content neutral regulations of time,
manner, and place of speech.24 Therefore, if a regulation is aimed at
the time, manner or place of speech, not the content thereof, then it is
subject to lower scrutiny.25 Conversely, if a regulation limits speech
based on its content, then it is subject to strict scrutiny.26
The Court found that both of the provisions of the injunction were
content neutral.27 Citing to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court
explained that the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality
is whether the government adopted a regulation of speech without
reference to the content of that speech.”28 Here, the Court found that
because the injunctions do not reference the content of the speech,
they are content neutral.29 However, the Court recognized that while
content neutral, these are injunctions, which pose a greater risk of
censorship than generally applicable laws.30 Therefore, the Court
applied a more “stringent application” of intermediate scrutiny, asking
“whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”31

21

Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 763.
23
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
24
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
25
Id.
26
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
27
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
28
Id. at 763 (quotation marks omitted).
29
Id. at 762.
30
Id. at 764-65.
31
Id. at 765.
22

5

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019

5

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

Applying this more "stringent" test, the Court found that the
thirty-six-foot fixed buffer zone was valid, but the 300-foot bubble
zone was not.32 The Court found that the thirty-six-foot fixed buffer
zone did not burden more speech than was necessary because the
governmental interest—providing safety and accessibility to the
clinic—justified the limited burden on speech in that limited area.33
However, the 300-foot no approach zone, in the Court's view,
burdened speech in too large of an area while pursuing a less
compelling governmental interest—preventing “clinic patients and
staff from being stalked or shadowed by the petitioners.”34 Citing to
Boos v. Barry, the Court explained that “in public debate our own
citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order
to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.”35
In so holding, the Court constructed the first principles for
abortion clinic bubble and buffer zones, finding them to be content
neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. At the same time, the
Court recognized the importance of unrestricted speech, especially in a
public forum, thereby justifying the use of a more “stringent”
application of intermediate scrutiny. The Court also showed that there
exists a positive relationship between the size of the restriction and the
governmental interest pursued. Thus, to be valid, the larger the radius,
the more compelling the interest has to be. Finally, Madsen also drew
the first line between a permissible limitation of speech—a fixed
thirty-six-foot buffer zone—and an impermissible one—a 300-foot no
approach bubble zone.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York
The next abortion buffer zone case to arrive at the Supreme Court
was Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York which
32

Id. at 769-70, 773-74.
Id. at 769-70.
34
Id. at 773-74 (quotations omitted).
35
Id. at 774 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
33
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involved another injunction.36 This time the lower court prohibited the
petitioners, abortion protestors, from approaching within fifteen feet of
any entrance to an abortion clinic (the buffer zone) and within fifteen
feet of any patient entering or leaving that clinic (the bubble zone).37
As the protestors appealed that injunction, the Supreme Court decided
Madsen, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied
explicitly on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Madsen to affirm the
injunction.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in
part and reversed in part.39
The Court found that the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone around the
entrance survived constitutional scrutiny, but the fifteen-foot floating
buffer zone around patients did not.40 The Court began by noting that
Madsen found similar injunctions to be content neutral and as such,
the Court did not discuss content neutrality here, but rather launched
straight into the Madsen intermediate scrutiny analysis.41 The Court
also noted that the governmental interests at play—public safety,
unrestricted access to clinics, and free-flow of traffic—are the same as
in Madsen and thus valid.42
First, the Court turned to the floating bubble zone, which
prohibited petitioners from approaching within fifteen feet of the
clinic's patients.43 The Court noted because this buffer zone floated
with the patient, it required the protestors to move as the patient
moved in order to avoid being within the buffer zone.44 The Court also
found it important that this provision impacted leafletting and
commenting on matters of public concern, which are the “classic

36

519 U.S. 357 (1997).
Id. at 367.
38
Id. at 370-71.
39
Id. at 385.
40
Id. at 376-77.
41
Id. at 374-85.
42
Id. at 376.
43
Id. at 377.
44
Id. at 377-78.
37
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forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment . . . .”45
The Court concluded that “because this broad prohibition on speech
‘floats,’ it cannot be sustained on this record.”46 But, the Court also
noted that it was not deciding “whether the governmental interests
involved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation between
individuals entering the clinics and protesters, measured by the
distance between the two.”47
Turning to the fixed buffer zone around the entrances to the clinic,
the Court found that the buffer zone properly regulated time, manner,
and place of speech, rather than its content.48 The Court upheld the
buffer zone, noting that the records showed that the protestors often
intentionally blocked access to the clinic.49 Therefore, the fixed buffer
zone was squarely aimed at limiting this practice and protecting the
governmental interest in safe access to the clinic.50
Schenck affirmed Madsen and provided further guidance on the
intersection of the First Amendment's freedom of speech and the
Fourteenth Amendment's fundamental right to access abortion. The
Court solidified its prior conclusion that buffer and bubble zones are
content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny (or a “more
stringent” application thereof). It also reaffirmed that buffer zones, if
properly tailored, likely survive this level of scrutiny even though the
First Amendment rights are enhanced in the context of discourse on
matters of public concern in public forum. And while Schenck struck
down the floating buffer zone, the Court did not answer the question
of whether any floating zone can survive constitutional scrutiny.
Hill v. Colorado

45

Id. at 377.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 380.
49
Id.
50
Id.
46
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In 2000 the Court answered that question in the affirmative.
Building off of its momentum from Madsen and Schenck, the Supreme
Court returned to abortion clinic bubble zone regulation. This time, in
Hill v. Colorado, the Court reviewed a Colorado statute that prohibited
people, within 100-feet of a reproductive health facility, from
knowingly approaching within eight-feet of a patient of the facility,
"for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to,
or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with" such a
patient.51 Abortion protesters challenged the law in state court arguing
that it is facially invalid, content based regulation aimed at suppressing
their free speech and press rights.52 The trial court upheld the statute,
the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme
Court denied review.53
While the protestors' petition for writ of certiorari was pending,
the Court decided Schenck. In light of that decision, the Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals, and
reversed for reconsideration in light of Schenck.54 On remand, the
Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its previous judgment, finding
that Schenck did not impact its analysis.55 The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s finding that the law was a
permissible regulation of time, manner, and place of speech which
survived intermediate scrutiny.56 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and affirmed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began the analysis by
noting that the protestors clearly have a First Amendment right to free
speech and the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the
“health and safety of their citizens.”57 This governmental interest
justifies regulations that ensure access to healthcare facilities, as well
51

Hill, 530 U.S. at 707.
Id. at 709.
53
Id. at 711.
54
Id. at 712.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 712-14.
57
Id. at 714-15.
52
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as “the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with
confrontational protests.”58 The government also has a legitimate
interest in regulations that provide specific guidance for law
enforcement, thereby promoting equal enforcement.59 And finally, the
Court noted that there is another interest at play here, that of “[t]he
unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication,”
stemming from the “right to be let alone” recognized in Olmstead v.
United States.60 But, the Court noted that this “right to be let alone” is
in tension with the First Amendment's “right to persuade.”61
The Court then moved on to the content neutrality analysis. The
Court explained that this inquiry asks whether the statute can be
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”62
Citing Ward, the Court explained that when determining content
neutrality, the “principal inquiry . . . is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.”63 Applying this test, the Court determined that
the Colorado statute is content neutral for three reasons.64 First, it is
not a “regulation of speech,” but merely a regulation of where some
speech may occur.65 Second, the statute is not motivated by a
disagreement with any particular message because it applies equally to
all demonstrators within the specified radius and does not refer to any
content of the speech.66 Third, the governmental interests pursued by
this statute—protecting patients' access and privacy and providing

58

Id. at 715 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. 753).
Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-16.
60
Id. at 716 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
61
Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("While the freedom to communicate is substantial, 'the
right of every person "to be let alone" must be placed in the scales with the right of
others to communicate.'" quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
62
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
63
Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
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clear guidelines to law enforcement—are unrelated to the content of
the regulated speech.67
The protestors argued that the law is still content based because
enforcement of the law will require examination of the content of the
speech.68 Since the law criminalizes approaching within eight feet of a
patient, “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest, education, or
counseling,” law enforcement must necessarily examine the content of
the speech to determine if one is engaging in “protest, education or
counseling,” or merely saying something else, such as good morning.69
The Court rejected this argument as being without merit.70 First,
without citing any authority, the Court explained that it is common for
law enforcement to have to examine a statement in order to determine
if a violation occurred—for example, a statement must be examined to
decide if it is blackmail, a threat, or a copyright violation.71 Moreover,
the Court, again without citing any authority, clarified that it has never
held that “it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written
statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a
course of conduct.”72 And finally, the Court noted that in this specific
context, it is unlikely that any such examination will practically be
required; rather, it will be obvious who is present outside of an
abortion clinic “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling.”73
Since the Court found that the statute is content neutral,
intermediate scrutiny applies and the law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest.74 The Court began by
accounting for the burden imposed by the statute on the three types of

67

Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 720.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 721.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
68
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regulated speech: signs, oral protest, and leafletting.75 The law
imposed minimum to no burden on signs displayed by protestors
because they can be read from eight feet away.76 As for oral protests,
the Court also found that eight feet is not burdensome because eight
feet is a “normal conversational distance.”77 However, for leafletting,
the Court conceded that the law imposed a “more serious” burden, but
still does not completely foreclose this form of communication. In an
apparent nod to Schenck, the Court noted that the statute does not
require someone who is already in the path of an incoming patient to
get out of the way.78 Thus, such a protestor may stand anywhere within
the 100-foot radius and may remain stationary even if that means that
at some point she will be within the eight-foot floating bubble of a
patient. 79 The statue only prohibits protestors from knowingly
approaching within eight feet of a patient.80
Noting the burden of the law, the Court explained that when
deciding tailoring, context is important because courts recognize
heightened governmental interest in certain places, such as schools,
courthouses, polling places, private homes, and healthcare facilities.81
And since the Colorado statute regulates speech around a healthcare
facility—a place where the governmental interest is heightened—the
law is an “exceedingly modest restriction.”82 Thus, the law survives
constitutional scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant interest.83
The protestors also argued the law is invalid because it is
overbroad and vague.84 The law is overbroad because it aims to
75

Hill, 530 U.S. at 726.
Id.
77
Id. at 726-27 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. 357).
78
Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 728.
82
Id. at 729.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 730-33.
76

12
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prevent a very specific problem—protests outside of abortion clinics—
but it applies to all healthcare facilities and bans all types of speech.85
The Court dismissed the first part of the argument on the grounds that
the statute's far reach to all healthcare facilities is a “virtue, not a
vice,” because it supports its content neutrality resulting in
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.86 As to the argument that the
statute bans too much speech, the Court explained that this is a
misreading of the law because it does not “ban” any speech; rather it
regulates certain speech in certain places.87 With regard to vagueness,
the Court quickly dismissed this concern, holding that “it is clear what
the ordinance as a whole prohibits.”88
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the Colorado statute, finding it
to be a content neutral regulation which is narrowly tailored to address
a significant governmental interest.89 Again, building off of Madsen
and Schenck, the Court confirmed its view that abortion clinic buffer
zones are content neutral. Hill also provided some much-needed
clarification on the tailoring requirement. Thus, while a fifteen-foot
floating bubble that required protestors to get out of the patient's way
placed too much burden on speech,90 an eight-foot floating bubble
zone that did not require protestors to get out of the way did not.
Likewise, a 300-foot radius is too large, but a 100-foot radius is not.
McCullen v. Oakley
Fourteen years after Hill, the Supreme Court agreed to review
McCullen v. Oakley, which was another challenge to an abortion clinic
buffer zone.91 This time, at issue was a Massachusetts law which
85

Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 731-32 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110
(1972)).
89
Hill, 530 U.S. at 725, 730.
90
See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
91
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014).
86
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created a fixed buffer zones on public walkways within thirty-five feet
of any entrance to a “reproductive health care facility.”92 A
reproductive health care facility was defined as “a place, other than
within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered
or performed.”93 The law, in effect, made it a crime to stand anywhere
within thirty-five feet of an abortion clinic during business hours.94 In
practice, the law lead clinics to paint an arc on the sidewalk outlining
the thirty-five foot radius.95 The law also exempted four classes of
people: 1) people entering or leaving the clinic; 2) employees or
agents, acting within the scope of their employment; 3) law
enforcement and other emergency services members; and 4) people
walking on a public sidewalk “solely for the purpose of reaching a
destination other than such facility.”96 The law was enacted as a means
to replace the prior regulation which created a six-foot floating bubble
within eighteen feet of a healthcare facility.97
The plaintiffs, abortion protestors who call themselves “sidewalk
counselors,” challenged the new law, arguing that it violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments on its face and as applied.98 After a bench
trial, the district court denied the plaintiffs' facial challenge, and the
First Circuit affirmed.99 On remand, the court also denied the asapplied challenge, and the First Circuit again affirmed.100 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, ultimately striking down the law.101
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts began by noting that the
law explicitly applies to anyone who enters or remains on a “public
92

MASS. GEN. LAWS, CH. 266, § 120E1/2(b) (2012).
Id. § 120E1/2(a).
94
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 472.
95
Id.
96
MASS. GEN. LAWS, CH. 266, § 120E1/2(b); see also McCullen, 573 U.S. at
93

472.
97

McCullen, 573 U.S. at 469-70.
Id. at 475.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 472.
101
Id. at 497.
98
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way or sidewalk,” a place known as traditional public fora and which
occupies a special place within the First Amendment jurisprudence.102
Again, the Court began by determining if the law was content
based.103 The plaintiffs advanced two arguments for why it was.104
First, it was content based because it applied only to health care
facilities that perform abortions, thus it targeted speech related to
abortions.105 Second, it was content based because by excluding clinic
employees, the law discriminated based on viewpoint.106
The Court rejected the first argument because the law is facially
neutral. Surely, the Court explained, the law “would be content based
if it required enforcement authorities to examine the content of the
message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has
occurred.”107 However, here, no such need exists because violation is
not based on what is said, but where it is said, or not said at all, since
the act can be violated by merely standing within the buffer zone
without speaking.108
The Court conceded that the law has an inevitable effect of
limiting abortion-related speech more than any other kind of speech.109
But, under Ward, the test for content neutrality is whether the law is
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” not
whether it burdens one type of speech more than another.110 And here,
the legislature's intent was to create a new law that would more
effectively promote public safety around abortion clinics, an interest
that the Court previously found to be content neutral.111 However,
102

Id. at 476.
Id. at 477, 485.
104
Id. at 478.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 479 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
383 (1984)).
108
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479-80.
109
Id. at 480.
110
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
111
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 480-81 (citing Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
103
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Justice Roberts noted that the law would not be content neutral if “it
were concerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct
impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to
speech.’”112 Finally the Court explained that it will not find an illmotive for the law because the law applies to abortion clinics only. 113
The State was merely responding to the problem it observed—
crowding and obstruction of access to abortion clinics—and no similar
problem existed with regard to other healthcare facilities in the
State.114
The Court also rejected the second argument, that the law is
content based because it exempts employees.115 The plaintiffs argued
that by exempting employees, the law allows employees—who will
likely speak favorably of abortion—to speak within the buffer zone,
while it prohibits others—who will likely speak against abortion—
from speaking in the same place.116 Thus, in effect, the law
discriminates based on abortion viewpoint.117 The court rejected this
argument, viewing the employee exception as reasonable and logical
to ensure smooth operation of the clinic.118 Indeed, because the
exemption applies only to employees who are acting in the scope of
their employment, it suggests that this is merely an exemption
necessary for the day-to-day operations of the facility, rather than an
insidious carve out to promote one side of a public debate.119 As such,
the Court found the law to be a content neutral regulation of the time,
manner, and place of speech.
However, the Court struck down the law for not being narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.120 The Court
112

Id.
Id. at 481.
114
Id. at 482.
115
Id. at 482-85.
116
Id. at 482-83.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 483-84.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 490.
113
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agreed that the State has a valid interest in promoting “public safety,
patient access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public
sidewalks and roadways.”121 And while the law served those interests,
it also imposed significant burdens on the plaintiffs who wished to
engage in sidewalk counseling, including one-on-one conversations
and leafletting, activities which are fundamental to the First
Amendment.122
Weighing the State's interests in ensuring public safety and access
to abortion clinics against the significant burden imposed on plaintiffs’
protected speech, the Court concluded that the law burdens more
speech than necessary.123 First, while other states and municipalities
regulate access to health care facilities (for example Colorado), no
other jurisdiction has a statute creating a hard, fixed buffer zone
around the clinic.124 This means that the State has forgone other, less
restrictive alternatives.125 Second, the law was redundant because
another provision of the same act already criminalized obstruction of
access to a healthcare clinic, and other state laws regulated public
access to clinics.126 Third, the Court noted that it prefers direct
injunctions against protestors who actually obstruct access over a
blanket exclusionary buffer zone that impacts even the peaceful
protestors.127 Fourth, while the record shows that the State was
concerned with protecting access to abortion clinics, access was only
restricted or obstructed at one clinic, and only on Saturday mornings,
but the law applied to all clinics, at all times.128
121

Id. at 486.
Id. at 487-89.
123
Id. at 490.
124
While the Court has previously upheld fixed buffer zones in Schenck and
Madsen, those cases involved injunctions, as opposed to generally applicable
statutes. Indeed, in those cases the Court relied on the fact that the challenged buffer
zones were injunctions and thus presumably more tailored than generally applicable
laws would be. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 380.
125
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490.
126
Id. at 490-91.
127
Id. at 492.
128
Id. at 493.
122
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Returning to this subject after fourteen years, the Supreme Court
again signaled that abortion clinic buffer zones are content neutral. But
McCullen added two significant holdings. First, Justice Roberts
explained that the law would be content based if the content of the
speech had to be examined to determine a violation of the law. Second,
the law would also be content based if it were concerned with the
effect of the speech on its listeners. Both points undermine Hill which
dismissed the concern over the need to examine content as being of no
consequence and which assumed that protecting listeners from
unwanted speech was a valid governmental interest. Additionally,
McCullen also signaled that buffer zones created by generally
applicable laws, as opposed to injunctions, are disfavored and usually
a result of forgoing other, less restrictive alternatives.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
The last case pertinent to this discussion, although not explicitly
related to buffer or bubble zones, is a 2015 decision striking down a
local ordinance that classified signs in Gilbert, Arizona.129 In 2005, the
town of Gilbert adopted the Sign Code (the "Code"), which classified
signs that were allowed to be displayed in the city into different
categories, based on the information they conveyed, and applied
varying restrictions to each category.130 Three specific categories were
at issue in Reed: ideological signs, political signs, and temporary
directional signs.131 Ideological signs were defined as signs for
noncommercial purpose and were subject to the least restrictions.132
Political signs were defined as signs designed to influence an election
and were subject to more restrictions than ideological signs.133 And
temporary directional signs, which were defined as signs directing

129

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
Id. at 2224.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 2224-25.
130
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people to an event, were subject to the most restrictions.134 Plaintiff, a
local church pastor, posted signs directing people to his Sunday church
service, but after the Code was enacted, his signs were not in
compliance with the restrictions imposed on temporary directional
signs.135 Plaintiff sued, alleging that the Code violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.136 The trial court denied the challenge and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that under Hill, the Code is content
neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest.137
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Code was content
based and failed strict scrutiny.138 The Court began by noting that there
are three types of content based laws.139 First, there are the facially
content based laws, which define speech based on its content.140
Second, there are the more subtle laws, which define speech by its
function or purpose.141 Finally, there is also a third category of content
based laws which arises out of Ward.142 These are facially content
neutral laws that cannot be justified without reference to the content of
the speech.143 Proper content neutrality analysis, as Justice Thomas
explained, tests the law at issue under all three categories.144 Applying
the test to the Code, the Court found it to be content based on its face
because it classified the signs based on the information conveyed.145

134

Id. at 2225.
Id. at 2225-26.
136
Id.
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Id. at 2226.
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Id. at 2231-32.
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Id. at 2227.
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Id.
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The Court next explained how the Ninth Circuit erred in finding
that the Code was content neutral.146 First, the lower court found the
law to be content neutral because it can be justified without reference
to its content.147 But this is not important here because the law is
content based on its face.148 The Court explained that applying the
Ward test for content neutrality skips the first two steps in the analysis:
determining if the law is content based on its face or by its function.149
The Ward test only applies in the third category of regulation, where
the law is not content based on its face and does not regulate speech
based on its function or purpose.150 Here, the Code is content based on
its face, thus there is no need to even apply the Ward content neutrality
test.151
The Ninth Circuit also found that the law was content neutral
because it did not single out any one idea for favorable treatment.152
But, the Court explained, this rationale confuses two First Amendment
prohibitions.153 The First Amendment prohibits viewpoint
discrimination as well as subject matter discrimination.154 Therefore,
strict scrutiny is triggered when a law discriminates among viewpoints
or subject matters.155 Here, while the law did not single out any one
viewpoint, it regulated an entire subject matter.156
Having determined that the Code was content based, the Court
applied strict scrutiny, which requires that the law be narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling governmental interest.157 The town of Gilbert
146

Id.
Id. at 2228.
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Id.
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presented two interests it was pursuing: preserving the town's aesthetic
appeal and traffic safety.158 Without commenting on whether these
interests are compelling, the Court concluded that the Code fails strict
scrutiny because it is underinclusive.159 This is because directional
signs—which are burdened with the most restrictive regulations—are
no more of an eye sore or pose any greater traffic safety concerns than
ideological or political signs, both of which are subject to lesser
restrictions.160
Reed provides the last piece of the puzzle. While the context is
different in Reed than in the other abortion clinic bubble and buffer
zone cases, Reed clarified the Ward content based analysis.
Specifically, the Court explained that there are three separate types of
content based regulation, and the law at issue must be evaluated under
each of the three types.161 In prior cases the Court only focused on
Ward's “justified without reference to the content” type. But Reed
makes clear that this is only one of the three possible types of content
based regulation, and failure to test the law under the other two types
is fatal to the analysis.
Price v. City of Chicago
In 2009, the City of Chicago passed an ordinance creating a fiftyfoot radius around the entrance of a hospital, medical clinic, or
healthcare facility.162 Within that radius, people are prohibited from
approaching within eight feet of another person, without consent, “for
the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.” (the “Chicago
Ordinance”).163 The Chicago Ordinance mirrored the Colorado statute
upheld in Hill, except that the latter applied within a 100-foot radius of
158

Id.
Id.
160
Id. at 2230-31.
161
Id. at 2227.
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CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-010(j)(1).
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a facility, whereas the former applies to a narrower, fifty-foot radius.164
In 2016, Veronica Price, and other pro-life “sidewalk counselors,”
sued the City of Chicago challenging the Chicago Ordinance.165 The
four-count complaint alleged that the Chicago Ordinance: (1) violated
the First Amendment, facially and as applied, by improperly restricting
their protected speech; (2) was unconstitutionally vague, in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) was
selectively enforced in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) improperly infringed the petitioners'
state rights to free speech and assembly.166 The City moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, which, relying on
Hill, the District Court granted as to the First Amendment and
vagueness claims, but denied as to the as applied challenge under the
First Amendment, the selective enforcement claim, and the state law
claims.167 The parties jointly moved to dismiss the remaining claims,
allowing Price to appeal the ruling on the facial challenge.168
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal.169 The
court explained that because the Ordinance mirrored, and indeed was
narrower than, the statute upheld in Hill, it was bound by the Court's
precedent.170 However, the Seventh Circuit noted that while the law
must be upheld under Hill, in the nineteen years since that decision,
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, specifically, McCullen and
Reed, significantly eroded the basic assumptions and conclusions in
Hill.171 And although the court affirmed the dismissal, it went on to
explain why Hill is of questionable authority.172

164

Price, 915 F.3d at1110.
Id. at 1109.
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Id. at 1110.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 1119.
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Id. at 1111.
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Id. at 1117.
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TENSION BETWEEN HILL, MCCULLEN, AND REED
Judge Sykes, of the Seventh Circuit, began the analysis in Price v.
City of Chicago by noting the force of the First Amendment in public
fora.173 Borrowing the phrase from Justice Roberts, the court noted
that public places such as sidewalks and walkways “occupy a special
position in terms of First Amendment protection because of their
historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”174 Therefore, Price and
other sidewalk counselors engage in counseling in the place where
their First Amendment rights have the strongest protections.175
Rounding out its introduction, the court remarked that content based
laws are subject to strict scrutiny, but regulations of time, manner, and
place of speech are evaluated under intermediate scrutiny.176 But, to
date, abortion clinic buffer and bubble zones have only been evaluated
under intermediate scrutiny.177
Next, the court turned to the evolution of abortion clinic buffer
and bubble zone jurisprudence.178 The court noted that buffer and
bubble zone regulations have been consistently held to be content
neutral.179 But the court noted that not all such regulations survived
constitutional scrutiny; Madsen struck down the 300-foot buffer zone
and Schenck struck down the fifteen-foot bubble zone.180 The Seventh
Circuit also noted that Schenck left open the question of “whether the
governmental interests involved would ever justify some sort of zone
of separation between individuals entering the clinics and protesters,
measured by the distance between the two.”

173
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Judge Sykes next reviewed Hill, McCullen, and Reed, providing a
detailed examination of each decision, before contrasting them.181 This
is where the Seventh Circuit laid out the evolution of abortion clinic
bubble and buffer zone jurisprudence and the eventual erosion of
Hill.182 First, the court noted that Hill began its content neutrality
analysis by asking if the government enacted the regulation because of
a disagreement with the message conveyed.183 But, as the Seventh
Circuit pointed out, Reed explained that the first step of the content
neutrality test requires testing the statute for content neutrality on its
face.184 Indeed, in Reed, Justice Thomas took the time to specifically
explain the three types of content based laws (facially obvious, subtle,
or unjustifiable without refence to content) and in no uncertain terms
clarified that courts need to test for each type before concluding that a
law is content neutral.185 Hill merely tested for the third type—
whether the law can be justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech. Finding that the law can be so justified, the Court
found it to be content neutral.186
The Seventh Circuit also pointed out that Hill did not completely
ignore the statute on its face; rather, it concluded that the statute was
content neutral because it did not discriminate based on viewpoint or
subject matter, and the Court was not concerned about law
enforcement having to evaluate content of speech to determine
violations.187 But as the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, McCullen and
Reed explicitly contradict both of those points.188 McCullen explained
that a law would be content based if law enforcement had to examine
the content of the message conveyed in order to determine if a

181

Id. at 1113-17.
Id. at 1117.
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Hill, 530 U.S. at 719; Price, 915 F.3d at 1117.
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violation occurred.189 And Reed explained that the fact that a law does
not discriminate based on viewpoint or subject matter does not absolve
an otherwise facially content based law from strict scrutiny.190
Judge Sykes then focused on the second category of content based
laws described in Reed.191 These are the subtle content based
regulations where the law focuses on the function or purpose of the
speech rather than its content.192 And Judge Sykes pointed out that the
regulation in Hill, as well as the Chicago Ordinance, cannot survive
this test because the plain text of each focuses on speech undertaken
“for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign
to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.”193 Moreover,
not only do these laws fall directly under Reed's subtle category of
content based regulation, they also require evaluation of the content of
the speech to determine if a violation occurred.194 And as McCullen
explained, examining the content of the speech to determine if a
violation occurred means that a law is content based.195
The Seventh Circuit next evaluated the governmental interest
stated in Hill.196 In Hill, the Court upheld the law partly because it
agreed that “protecting listeners from unwanted communication” and
protecting the right to be “let alone,” are valid governmental
interests.197 Yet, in McCullen, Justice Roberts noted that the law would
be content based if “it were concerned with undesirable effects that

189

McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479 (quoting CC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
190
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230.
191
Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
192
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227; Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
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CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-010(j)(1) (emphasis added); see also Hill, 530 U.S.
at 707.
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Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
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Id.; McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479.
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Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
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Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
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arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’
reactions to speech.’”198
Lastly, Judge Sykes noted yet another point of tension. In Hill,
Colorado argued that one of its compelling governmental interests was
providing regulation that will be easy to enforce.199 In upholding the
bubble zone regulation, the Court approved that interest, explaining
that laws that offer clear guidance to law enforcement promote equal
enforcement of the law.200 Indeed, Hill stated that a “brightline
prophylactic rule may be the best way to provide protection, and, at
the same time, by offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to
protect speech itself.”201 This is in stark contrast with McCullen's
explanation that a “painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but
the prime objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”202
Recognizing that it is bound by Hill, the Seventh Circuit
grudgingly affirmed the Chicago Ordinance as a content neutral
regulation of time, manner, and place of speech that is narrowly
tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest. But in its
analysis, the court provided an avenue for the Supreme Court to clarify
the validity of Hill post McCullen and Reed. Or perhaps even created a
vehicle for the Court to overrule Hill and clarify the proper test for
abortion clinic bubble and buffer zones—which on their face are
content based.
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FIND THAT ABORTION CLINIC BUBBLE
AND BUFFER ZONES ARE CONTENT BASED REGULATIONS SUBJECT TO
STRICT SCRUTINY
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the tension between Hill
and the Court's subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence in
McCullen and Reed. Tension, that when properly explored,
198

McCullen, 573 U.S. at 481 (citing Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-16.
200
Id.
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Id. at 729.
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McCullen, 573 U.S. at 495.
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undermines the Court's reasoning in Hill, and properly questions the
current precedent which holds that abortion bubble and buffer zone are
content neutral regulations. From Madsen until McCullen, the Court
had gone to great lengths to find those laws to be content neutral,
when in fact, they are anything but that. The Court maintained its
consistency in the context of abortion clinic bubble zones. But the
Court's decision in Reed undermines the basic rationale that led the
Court to deem the bubble zone regulation to be content neutral in the
first place. Whether intentional or not, Reed clarified the Ward
framework, eroding the very foundation of Madsen, Schenck, Hill, and
McCullen. The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the tension between Reed,
McCullen, and Hill recognizes the correct test to be applied when
determining the content neutrality of a statute. The statute should be
tested for content neutrality by asking if it: 1) discriminates based on
content on its face; 2) discriminates based on the function or purpose
of speech; and 3) can be justified without reference to the content of
the speech. Applying this correct test to abortion clinic buffer and
bubble zone regulations should result in finding that those regulations
are content based and thus subject to strict scrutiny.
Abortion Clinic Bubble Zone Laws Are Content Based
Although Madsen, and its progeny, hold that abortion clinic
bubble and buffer zones are content neutral, this conclusion is wrong.
For starters, the law in Hill was plainly content based. The law
prohibited approaching a patient of a healthcare facility, if the
approach is “for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral protest, education,
or counseling . . . .”203 As the Seventh Circuit noted, by regulating
speech defined by its function or purpose, such laws fall squarely
under the subtle content based regulation defined in Reed.204 To be
sure, the Colorado legislature specifically avoided any reference to the
topic of abortion, and instead drafted a broad prohibition on speech

203
204

Hill, 530 U.S. at 707, n.1.
Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
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outside of healthcare facilities generally.205 But, as the majority in Hill
correctly noted, the law was motivated by protests outside of abortion
clinics.206 The legislative history is especially telling.207 The law’s
sponsor introduced it by saying that “all Colorado women have the
right to reproductive choice . . . [but] anti-abortion groups are
picketing women's health clinics across the state and are trying to
intimidate or physically block all people's entry into these clinics . . .
.”208 And when the bill was signed into law, the sponsor referred to the
law as “the only significant pro-choice bill to pass in Colorado since
1967.”209
Furthermore, the law is also content based on its face. The
preamble to the law states, in part, that “the exercise of a person's right
to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be
balanced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling
and treatment in an unobstructed manner . . . .”210 As Justice Scalia
argued in his dissent, “[t]he word ‘against’ reveals the legislature's
desire to restrict discourse on one side of the issue regarding ‘certain
medical procedures.’”211 Yet, the majority concluded that the law was
content neutral. Despite legislative history, which indicates that the
only driving force behind this statue was concern over protests outside
of abortion clinics, and the very text of the statute, which expressed

205

See Alan Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth,
and Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 52 (2003)
(discussing the evolution of the overbreadth doctrine which pressures legislators to
draft overbroad regulation in order to avoid the impression of viewpoint or content
based discrimination).
206
Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (“the legislative history makes it clear that its
enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”).
207
Chen, supra note 205 at 51-55.
208
Id. at 51 (citing the Joint Appendix in Hill).
209
Abortion Clinic "Bubble" Bill Signed, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 20, 1993, at B4.
210
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707, n.1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999)
(emphasis added).
211
Hill, 530 U.S. at 768-69 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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concern over the discourse on only one side of the issue, the Court
found the law to be content neutral.
As the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, the Court’s content
neutrality analysis was flawed. The Court only asked whether the law
can be justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.212 But, this is only part of the inquiry. The majority in Hill
cited to Ward for its content neutrality test. The Court in Ward upheld a
New York City regulation which limited amplified sound from one of
the city’s public venues.213 The Court noted that the regulation has
nothing to do with content and that “[t]he principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time,
place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.”214 A decade later, Hill relied on this statement in
Ward in conducting its content neutrality analysis. However, what
Ward described as the principal inquiry in deciding content neutrality,
the Court in Hill took as the only inquiry.
Similarly, other abortion clinic buffer and bubble zone regulations
are also content based. For example, in McCullen, although the Court
concluded that the law was content neutral, the law on its face appears
to be content based. First of all, the Act was entitled, “Protesting and
Educating in the Vicinity of Reproductive Health Care Facilities
Restricted.”215 The title alone gives away the clear goal and purpose of
the law—to regulate protesting and educating outside of abortion
clinics. The Act defined “reproductive health care facilities” as “a
place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where
abortions are offered or performed,” otherwise known as an abortion
clinic.216 No one could seriously argue that there are any protests
outside of abortion clinics that are not related to the topic of abortion.

212

Id. at 719; Price, 915 F.3d at 1117.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 803.
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Id. at 791.
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Thus, the title of the Act alone shows its focus on the content of the
speech.
Additionally, the law applied only during the clinic’s business
hours, further illustrating that the legislature was not concerned with
content neutral goals such as regulating noise, but rather sought to
stymie anti-abortion protestors. That goal is anything but content
neutral, meaning that the law created to pursue that goal, the buffer
zone, is also anything but content neutral.
The Chicago Ordinance at issue in Price suffers the same fatal
flaw. The law was styled after Hill, which after applying the correct
analysis, is content based. The Chicago Ordinance is also content
based because it defines speech based on its purpose and function.
Like the Colorado statute, the Chicago Ordinance prohibits
approaching within eight feet of a patient of an abortion clinic “for the
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.”217 Again, under the
clarified test from Reed, a law that regulates speech based on its
function or purpose is content based.218 The Chicago Ordinance
explicitly targets speech undertaken for a specific “purpose,” and is
therefore content based.
The Court Correctly Recognized Content Based Regulation in Other
Contexts
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to find that abortion clinic buffer
and bubble zones are content based is a notable deviation from its
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. In other contexts, the
Court has been rather critical of plainly content based regulation. In R.
A. V. v. St. Paul, the Court struck down a municipal law prohibiting
certain acts and symbols which are known to “arouse[] anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.”219 The Court unanimously concluded that such a law, while
217

CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-010(j)(1) (emphasis added).
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
219
505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).
218
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well meaning, is an impermissible content based restriction.220
Beginning its content based analysis with looking at the face of the
statute, the Court found that the statute is content based on its face
because it prohibits only those fighting words that arouse anger “on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” while allowing
fighting words that arouse anger on some other basis.221 The Court
explained that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit [imposing]
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects.”222 But the Court went even further, noting that
this regulation discriminates not only based on content, but also based
on viewpoint.223 That is because the law would permit those arguing
for race equality to use fighting words, while prohibiting those arguing
against it from using the same fighting words.224 The Court concluded
that “[the government] has no such authority to license one side of a
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.”225
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court found that a Vermont
statute prohibiting pharmaceutical sales representatives from using a
physician’s prescription history for marketing purposes was a content
based regulation.226 Here, the Court also began its analysis by looking
at the face of the statute and found it to be content based because it
220

Id. at 391.
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 391-92 (“In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays
containing some words -- odious racial epithets, for example -- would be prohibited
to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that do not themselves invoke race,
color, creed, religion, or gender -- aspersions upon a person's mother, for example -would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of
racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers’
opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic
bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and
provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’”)
225
Id.
226
564 U.S. 552, 563-64 (2011).
221

31

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019

31

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

prohibited use of a certain kind of speech (a physician’ prescription
history) for a specific purpose (marketing), while allowing the use of
the same speech for other purposes.227 The Court also found that the
statute discriminated based on a speaker’s identity because it only
prohibited pharmaceutical sales representatives from using this kind of
speech, while everyone else was allowed to use it.228 Therefore,
because the law, on its face, targeted speech taken for a certain
purpose—marketing—the statute was content based. 229 The Court also
looked to legislative history to bolster its conclusion, noting that
“[f]ormal legislative findings accompanying [the statute] confirm that
the law's express purpose and practical effect are to diminish the
effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”230
Likewise, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the
Court concluded, albeit in a much more contested manner than R. A.
V., splitting 5-4, that a regulation which required adult content to be
scrambled or aired during certain, limited hours, is an improper
content based regulation.231 The Court concluded that because the
regulation’s primary concern is the effect of adult material on youth,
its justification is explicitly tied to its content and the therefore the law
is content based.232 The Court recognized the government’s concern
over youth having access to adult material on television.233 However,
the Court explained that, “[w]here the designed benefit of a content
based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the
general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less
restrictive alternative exists.”234 In no unequivocal terms, the Court
explained that the First Amendment’s prohibition on content based
discrimination trumps the government’s concern over the impact of
227

Id.
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 564-65.
231
529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
232
Id. at 811.
233
Id. at 813-14.
234
Id. at 813.
228
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that content on the listener. 235 Indeed, few people would disagree with
the policy that youth should be shielded from adult content, yet the
Court explained that the effect of the speech will not transform a
plainly content based regulation into a content neutral one. 236 Notably,
the Court decided Playboy a month before Hill, and Justice Stevens,
who authored the majority opinion in Hill, joined the majority in
Playboy, indicating that he thought this analysis was correct. Yet, a
month later, the Court did not follow its own analysis.
And finally, most recently, in Reed, the Court did not hesitate to
call a law regulating use of signs content based on its face.237 As
explained above, the Court began its analysis with the text of the
statute and concluded that the law is content based because it defined
the regulated signs based on the content of the information the sign
conveys.238 The Court then explained that a “law . . . is content based
on its face . . . regardless of the government’s benign motive, content
neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in
the regulated speech.”239
The Court has never before hesitated to call a law which regulates
speech based on its content, exactly what it is—a content based
regulation. Despite the morally right purpose that the law may serve,
such as the anti-racially and religiously charged hate speech in R. A. V.,
or the desire to protect youth from pornographic materials in Playboy,
the Court adhered to its analytical framework. That framework is to
first look at the text of the statute to determine if the law discriminates
based on the content of speech. If the government seeks to root out
some evil, vile, or plain wrong conduct, but does so only for a limited
group of people because of its disagreement with that group’s
viewpoint, the regulation is content based.240 This was true in R. A. V.
235

Id.
Id.
237
135 S. Ct. at 2227.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 2228.
240
And such regulation is likely also view-point based. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
236

391.
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where the government prohibited the use of symbols or acts meant to
invoke anger based on race or religion, a righteous goal, but allowed
use of the same symbols or acts to invoke anger that is based in some
reason other than race or religion.
A similar problem appeared in Sorrell. The State wanted to
prevent pharmaceutical companies from directly targeting physicians
which could undermine their medical decisions. To achieve this
righteous goal, the state prohibited a certain class of speakers—
pharmaceuticals sales representatives—from using certain speech for a
specific purpose—prescription history for the purpose of marketing.
By focusing on the intent of the speaker, the State targeted a sub-part
of the entire class of speakers and imposed a burden on that group.
Just as in R. A. V., the regulation in Sorrell was content based on its
face and the Court did not have a hard time reaching that conclusion.
R. A. V. was a unanimous decision, and in Sorrell, the three dissenters
did not raise issue with the Court’s content based analysis.241
Likewise, in Playboy, the government wished to protect youth
from adult video content, again a righteous goal, by requiring those
that primarily stream such content to either scramble their signal or
limit it to overnight only. Congress sought to achieve this goal by
targeting specific content—sexually oriented programming—and a
specific class of speakers—those that primarily distribute such
content. And again, the Court correctly found that regulating certain
speech based on its content makes the law content based. The same
conclusion appears in Reed. The Court did not quibble about whether a
statute that separates signs into categories based only on the message it
conveys is a content based regulation. In a unanimous decision, the
Court concluded, “[o]n its face, the Sign Code is a content based
regulation of speech. We thus have no need to consider the
government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to
determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”242
241

Rather, they argued that regulation should be subjected to lesser scrutiny as
it affects commercial speech only. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
242
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
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These four cases illustrate a common principle: the Court knows
how to determine if a regulation is content based. That determination
starts with the text. If a regulation defines the speech by the message
conveyed, like in Reed or Playboy, the Court will find it content based
on its face. However, the law does not need to be as explicitly content
based in order to receive strict scrutiny, because the Court will also
look to the purpose or function of that speech. And just like in Sorrell
and R. A. V., where the regulation prohibited speech taken for a
specific purpose, such as marketing or invoking racially- or
religiously-based anger, the Court will also find it to be content based.
Finally, the Court will also look to the legislative history and purpose
of the law. This played an especially important role in Sorrell, where
the Court found content bias in the text, but still looked to legislative
history and found specific language from the legislature showing
intent to discriminate against one subgroup—pharmaceutical
marketers.
This analytical framework guides the Court in determining
whether a statute is content neutral. This is true regardless of how
righteous or morally correct the purpose of the law is. Whether it’s
preventing hate crime, shielding youth from obscene content, or
ensuring the best medical care, the law will still be content based.
Meaning, the purpose or justification for the law has no bearing on
whether it is content based. To be sure, the law’s purpose or
justification is of great importance when deciding if the law survives
the required scrutiny. But the law’s purpose plays no role in deciding
which level of scrutiny applies.
Hill’s Analysis Was Outcome Driven
The reason why the Court in Hill departed from its traditional
content neutrality analysis lies in the context of abortion clinic buffer
and bubble zone laws. Those laws impact the ability of abortion
protestors to express their view on abortion. A view that runs contrary
to the current laws in the United States, which recognize a
fundamental right in access to abortion. Therefore, because of the
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sensitive nature of the underlying debate—whether abortions should
be allowed or not—the Court appears to have applied an altered
content neutrality analysis to the plainly content based laws. This then
allowed the Court to find those laws to be content neutral and thus
subject to lower scrutiny, ensuring that at least some portions of those
laws survive. And this is exactly what Justice Scalia called out in his
dissent in Hill, stating,
None of these remarkable conclusions should come as a
surprise. What is before us, after all, is a speech regulation
directed against the opponents of abortion, and it therefore
enjoys the benefit of the “ad hoc nullification machine” that
the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines
of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored
practice.243
Justice Scalia referred to anti-abortion protesting as a “highly favored
practice” and accused the majority of creating the “ad hoc nullification
machine,” which allows the Court to uphold laws which limit this
“favored practice.” Put otherwise, Justice Scalia accused the majority
of creating a different constitutional test that is applied only to
regulations that limit the ability of people to protest against abortions.
Soon after the decision was published, scholars recognized that Hill’s
content neutrality analysis was modified, and indeed flawed.244

243

Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
See David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment
and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 993 n.361 (2001)
244

The dissents in Hill appear to have it right. The majority’s first
supposed reason for treating the Colorado statute as content neutral
is so patently inadequate as to call into question the majority’s
entire treatment of the issue . . . The majority’s test really only
determines whether the statute is a “place” regulation (and thus a
“time, place, or manner” regulation); just because it is does not
mean that it cannot be content based. The majority’s test would be
an adequate reason for inferring content neutrality only if a law’s
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The critics of Hill’s content neutrality analysis largely agree that
Colorado’s statute was content based. First, the law’s preamble on its
face singled out specific speech—protest against certain medical
procedures (read: abortions). Yet the Court found it to be content
neutral. The law also explicitly described the regulated speech in terms
of its purpose and function, prohibiting only that speech which is taken
for the purpose of “oral protest, education, or counseling.” Yet the
Court found it to be content neutral. Then, the Court merely
disregarded the legislative history, despite its precedent which requires
the Court to look to legislative history to determine proper intent even
if the statue is content neutral on its face.245 Had the Court engaged in
content neutrality and its being a time-place-manner regulation
were equivalent. But, as the dissent properly notes, they are not.
Second, even if Colorado's statute was not adopted because of
disagreement with the message of abortion protesters,
disagreement with the expression of that message to women about
to undergo abortions clearly undergirds the statute. Even if the
Colorado Supreme Court's holding that the statute applies to "all
demonstrators" is taken not to raise any due process concerns
despite the statute's being addressed only to "oral protest,
education, or counseling," it still skews the expressive landscape
(or lawscape) with respect to abortion: A person who wishes to
escort a woman into a clinic in order to support her decision to
have an abortion would not be a "demonstrator," and it is
implausible that police would be equipped to prosecute any clinic
escorts who might utter reassurances to a woman that technically
might fall within the statute's definition of "counseling." A person
who wishes to dissuade a woman from having an abortion, on the
other hand, is forbidden to approach to "counsel" without
permission.
Third, the majority essentially reduced the content neutrality
inquiry solely to the question whether the challenged regulation is
related to the suppression or content of expression, over the
dissenters' cogent protestation that this is only the "principal
inquiry."
245

Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534 (1993) (holding that, under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause,
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a proper statutory interpretation of the Colorado law, it would have
quickly found ill-intent.
The legislative history is riddled with hints of bias against
abortion protestors.246 To be fair, the Court did not just completely
refuse to discuss legislative history. In fact, the majority noted that
“the legislative history makes it clear that its enactment was primarily
motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”247 Indeed,
the law’s sponsor referred to it as a “the only significant pro-choice
bill to pass in Colorado since 1967.”248 Yet, the Court found it to be
content neutral, refusing to read this motive as giving the statute an
improper purpose. Finally, looking past the statutory text and
legislative history, above all, the Court reduced the content neutrality
to one singular inquiry: whether the challenged regulation is related to
the suppression or content of expression.249 But, as the dissent
correctly pointed out, while this is the “the principal inquiry . . . it is
not the only inquiry.”250 Still, the majority, relying on Schenck and
Madsen, which dealt with injunctions rather than statutes, folded the
entire content neutrality analysis into this one inquiry. An inquiry,
which after Reed, we know is incomplete. Simply put, Hill’s content
based analysis marks a significant departure from the Court’s
traditional content based analysis. The reason for this appears to be
that the majority’s reasoning was outcome driven: the Court wanted to
ensure that the laws limiting speech outside of abortion clinics survive,
thus the Court went to great length to call it content neutral and subject
to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.

the Court could look beyond a law's facial neutrality to examine the discriminatory
purpose of the law).
246
For an in-depth discussion of the legislative history, see Chen, supra note
205 at 51-55.
247
Hill, 530 U.S. at 715.
248
Abortion Clinic "Bubble" Bill Signed, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 20, 1993, at B4.
249
Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); see also Cruz, supra
note 244 at 993 n.361.
250
Hill, 530 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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The Future of Abortion Clinic Buffer and Bubble Zones
The Court does not need to go through the legal gymnastics
required to squeeze the abortion clinic bubble and buffer zone laws
into intermediate scrutiny. While it is less demanding than strict
scrutiny, abortion clinic buffer and bubble zones likely can survive
strict scrutiny. Narrow tailoring is beyond the scope of this article, but
if the Court properly recognizes those laws to be content based, then
those laws would need to be narrowly tailored toward a compelling
governmental interest, rather than a significant interest required under
intermediate scrutiny. And the Court has provided enough guidance to
shed some light on this question. Albeit writing in the context of
intermediate scrutiny, the Court has signaled that the greater the
interest pursued by these bubble and buffer zones, the greater physical
distance that Court is willing to uphold.
To understand the tailoring implications, it makes most sense to
discuss bubble zones separately from buffer zones. Looking at bubble
zones, in Madsen, the Court struck down the prohibition on
approaching patients that are within 300 feet of a clinic. 251 The
injunction in that case actually did not prohibit approaching within
certain number of feet, but generally prohibited “physically
approaching” patients.252 Had the law survived, a better definition of
approach would be needed, but for purposes of this discussion we will
assume that “physically approaching” meant approaching from a
distance greater than eight feet, perhaps merely taking some steps
toward that patient from as far away as ten or fifteen feet.253 Under

251

Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70, 773-74.
Id. at 760-61.
253
This is a reasonable assumption given that the Court in Hill upheld an
eight-foot bubble zone, but in Schenck, the Court explicitly left open the question of
whether any distance between the patient and the protestor can survive constitutional
scrutiny. Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, it is reasonable to assume
that in Madsen, which came before Schenck and Hill, “approaching” could have
included merely taking steps toward the patient from a distance beyond eight feet. If
it were eight feet, or smaller, then we already know that this would likely survive.
252
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such definition, we know that this law would fail strict scrutiny since it
failed intermediate scrutiny in Madsen.
Next, in Schenck, the Court dealt with a more precise injunction,
which prohibited approaching within fifteen feet of a patient.254 Like
in Madsen, this bubble zone was struck down as not being narrowly
tailored. But, at the same time, the Court upheld a fifteen-foot buffer
zone around the clinic’s entrance.255 This signals that the Court will
require a closer fit, or a small radius, for bubble zones, than buffer
zones. And since the Court in Hill thought that an eight-foot bubble
survived intermediate scrutiny, it logically follows that to survive the
heightened requirement of strict scrutiny, the law will likely need to be
slightly more closely tailored. Finally, the Court left yet another clue
for the tailoring task, noting that a floating bubble that requires people
to get out of the way, as was the case in Schenck, is more restrictive
than a floating bubble that allows protestors to remain stationary, as
was the case in Hill.256
Thus, we have a sliding scale. A general restriction on “physically
approaching” is not narrowly tailored. Neither is a fifteen-foot floating
bubble. But an eight-foot bubble that allows a person to remain
stationary is narrowly tailored. Now, this sliding scale exists under
intermediate scrutiny, meaning that the Court thought eight feet was
narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest. If the
Court properly recognizes bubble and buffer zones as content based,
then the required interest would have to be compelling, rather than
significant.
There exists a serious question as to whether the Court will accept
the same interests that the Court previously found significant—
ensuring access and preventing patients and staff from being “stalked
or shadowed”257—as also being compelling. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit correctly pointed out that some of the interests that the Hill
Court relied on—"protecting listeners from unwanted communication"
254

Schenck, 519 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 376-77.
256
Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
257
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773-74 (internal quotations omitted)
255
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and protecting the right to be "let alone"—are not likely to be found
valid after McCullen. 258 But, even if they are found to be valid,
because of the more exacting nature of strict scrutiny, the distance
upheld under intermediate scrutiny will probably need to be adjusted.
Therefore, while an eight-foot bubble may be narrowly tailored to
pursue a significant governmental interest (intermediate scrutiny), the
distance may have to be smaller to be narrowly tailored to pursue a
compelling governmental (strict scrutiny). How much more narrowly
remains to be seen.
Turning to the buffer zones, that analysis here is simpler. The
Court has evaluated buffer zones in the context of both injunctions and
generally applicable laws. Looking to injunctions first, the Court has
previously upheld a fifteen-foot injunction buffer zone in Schenck and
a thirty-six-foot injunction buffer zone in Madsen. 259 But, in
McCullen, the Court struck down a generally applicable thirty-fivefoot buffer. 260 This illustrates the principle that injunctions, by their
very own nature, are more narrowly tailored than generally applicable
laws. Therefore, when it comes to injunctions, again, under
intermediate scrutiny, up to thirty-six feet is okay. Assuming that the
interests that the Court found to be significant—"public safety, patient
access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks and
roadways"261—are also compelling (an easier assumption then with
regard to bubble zones) it is likely that similar, if not that same, buffer
zones would survive. Since strict scrutiny is more exacting, the Court
may demand a closer fit here, which would reduce the buffer zone to
somewhere between thirty-six and fifteen feet.
Turning to generally applicable laws, however, poses a harder
question. The only case to address generally applicable buffer zone
was McCullen, and it struck down the thirty-five-foot buffer zone. So
here we simply do not have much indication from the Court as to what
distance, if any, may survive constitutional scrutiny.
258

Price, 915 F.3d at 1118.
Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376-77; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70, 773-74.
260
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 497.
261
Id. at 486.
259
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CONCLUSION
Bubble and buffer zones around healthcare facilities are content
based regulations. Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found them
to be content neutral. The result is that these laws, which are aimed at
limiting anti-abortion protestors’ First Amendment protections, only
need to be narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental
interest. This comes at a cost. The cost being that the Court has created
a separate content-neutrality test applicable only to abortion clinic
buffer and bubble zone laws. Under this test, a law is content based
only if it cannot be justified without reference to the content of the
speech. If the Court’s goal is to ensure that the anti-abortion protests
do not escalate to dangerous levels, there is another way to achieve
that result. Correctly recognizing that abortion clinic bubble and buffer
zones are content based would mean that they are subject to strict
scrutiny. But, that does not have to be the fatal blow to these wellintentioned regulations.
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